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We incorporate trade imbalances into a quantitative model of bilateral trade in manufactures, dividing
the world into forty countries. Fitting the model to 2004 data on GDP and bilateral trade we calculate
how relative wages, real wages, and welfare would differ in a counterfactual world with all current
accounts balancing. Our results indicate that closing the current accounts requires modest changes
in relative wages. The country with the largest deficit (the United States) needs its wage to fall by
around 10 percent relative to the country with the largest surplus (Japan). But the prevalence of nontraded
goods means that the real wage in Japan barely rises while the U.S. real wage falls by less than 1 percent.
The geographic barriers implied by the current pattern of trade are sufficiently asymmetric that large
bilateral deficits remain even after current accounts balance. The U.S. manufacturing trade deficit
with China falls to $65 billion from its 2004 level of $167 billion.
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kortum@uchicago.eduTheories of international trade typically assume trade balance. Yet any newspaper
reader knows that trade is far from balanced, a source of great unease among the citizens
of deﬁcit countries. We incorporate imbalances into a quantitative model of trade ﬂows
to calculate what relative wages, real wages, the manufacturing share of GDP, and the
pattern of bilateral trade would look like in a counterfactual world with all current accounts
balancing. While our exercise does not point to what policy would eliminate the imbalances,
it does suggest the magnitudes of the long-run adjustments that such a policy would entail.
We conduct our analysis using data for 2004 for the world, dividing it into forty “coun-
tries.”1 Table 1 lists the countries, their GDP’s and several diﬀerent external balance mea-
sures.2 The table begins with the broadest measure, the current account balance, followed
by the balance on goods and services, ending with the balance on manufactures.3 The
United States has by far the greatest current account imbalance, running a deﬁcit of $664
1We took the ﬁfty largest, as measured by GDP in 2000, grouping all others into a “country” labeled
ROW. Due to poor data we moved Saudi Arabia, Poland, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Puerto Rico,
and the Czech Republic into ROW as well. To mitigate the eﬀect of entrepôt trade, which our approach
here is ill-equipped to handle, we have combined (1) Belgium, Luxembourg (which we pulled out of ROW),
and the Netherlands, (2) Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, and (3) China and Hong Kong
into single entities. The result is forty entities, which we henceforth refer to as countries, spanning the
globe.
2Sources are as follows: GDP is from the World Bank (2006), the current account balance and balance
on goods and services are from IMF (2006), trade in manufactures (unilateral and bilateral) is from United
Nations Statistics Division (2006). The most recent bilateral trade data are for 2004; hence all of our
analysis is based on that year.
3A well known statistical discrepancy results in nonzero current account balances and trade balances for
the world. For analytical reasons, we want to remove this discrepancy. Rather than force it all into ROW,
we instead attributed one fortieth of it to each country. Since we measure bilateral trade in manufactures
f r o mt h ei m p o r t e rs i d e ,t h et r a d eb a l a n c eo ft h eworld in manufactures is zero by construction.
1billion or nearly 6 percent of its GDP.4 The countries with the largest current account
balances, Japan, Germany, and China (in that order), collectively run a surplus of $362
billion. For the largest players, the trade balance in manufactures is the main piece of the
overall current account. It’s the focus of our analysis here.
While unilateral imbalances command considerable attention, the U.S. obsession with
China’s trade suggests that bilateral trade imbalances are also a major concern. The last
two columns of Table 1 report each country’s bilateral trade surplus in manufactures with
the United States and with China. Note that the U.S. trade deﬁcit with China is one third of
its total deﬁcit in manufactures while China’s surplus with the United States is larger than
its overall trade surplus in manufactures. China is running a manufacturing trade deﬁcit
with the world less the United States. Note in particular that China runs sizable deﬁcits
with many of its neighbors in the Asia Paciﬁc region. Its largest deﬁcit is with Japan. The
United States runs deﬁcits with most countries. Our analysis yields predictions about how
these bilateral imbalances would respond to an elimination of unilateral current account
imbalances.
Table 2 reports gross manufacturing exports and imports as well as the manufacturing
trade balance. It also indicates what the manufacturing trade surplus would have to be
in order to set current account balances to zero, holding ﬁxed other components of the
current account. Note that by far the largest adjustment is required for the United States,
an increase in net exports of manufactures from a deﬁcit of over $485 billion to a surplus
4Among the deﬁcit countries in 2004, the U.S. current account deﬁcit is large even relative to GDP.
Only Australia, Greece, and Portugal have larger deﬁcit to GDP ratios. Several small countries run current
account surpluses that are much larger fractions of their GDP’s, however. The Bureau of Economics
Analysis reports that the US current account deﬁcit rose to $857 billion in 2006.
2of $179 billion. The next largest adjustments are decreases in net manufacturing exports:
Japan’s and Germany’s surpluses each fall to just over $100 billion while China’s falls to
$36 billion. In this paper we explore the implications of achieving this particular set of
trade balances in manufactures.
Our methodology builds on a recent literature that integrates the gravity equation exhib-
ited by bilateral trade ﬂows into general equilibrium.5 This research provides a framework
for tracking the implications of various counterfactuals and policy experiments for diﬀerent
countries of the world, recognizing the role of t r a d eb a r r i e r si nf r a g m e n t i n gw o r l dm a r k e t s .
We put such a model of bilateral trade to work to assess the counterfactual experiment
of simultaneously removing current account imbalances from each country. We examine
the resulting bilateral imbalances, relative wages, real wages, welfare, and manufacturing’s
share in these forty economies.
While our theoretical framework is one that has been used before in modeling bilateral
trade, we depart from a central feature of the gravity speciﬁcation. The standard approach
has used sundry geographical, historical, linguistic, and political variables as indicators of
bilateral resistance to trade. Instead, we treat bilateral resistance for each country pair as
a parameter which we identify, in combination with other parameters of the model, directly
from current bilateral trade data, letting the bilateral trade ﬂows speak for themselves.6
5Contributions include Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Redding and
Venables (2004), and Chaney (2006).
6Equation (15) in Eaton and Kortum (2002) provides a hint that one can go a long way without imposing
structure on trade costs. They show how the share of spending on domestic producers provides a simple
statistic for a country’s gains from trade. Furthermore Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) show
that the bilateral trade matrix was a suﬃcient statistic for the matrix of trade costs in simulating a model
of individual producers in international competition. Recent work by Waugh (2007) pursues a related
3A drawback of the standard approach for our analysis here is that the commonly used
indicators for bilateral resistance are typically symmetric, often with the implication that,
the error component aside, trade should balance bilaterally. By treating bilateral resistance
as a parameter that we infer from data we impose no structure, not even symmetry, on the
determinants of bilateral trade. China suggests a major deviation from symmetry with its
large manufacturing trade surplus with the relatively distant United States in combination
with its large deﬁcits with its neighbors.
Our attempt to quantify the implications of eliminating current account deﬁcits comes
with two important disclaimers. First, our exercise is pure comparative statics. We oﬀer
no explanation for why the current account deﬁcits exist or what market response or policy
intervention would close them.7 We simply use current data to parameterize a static model
of bilateral trade ﬂows and calculate the new equilibrium with zero deﬁc i t s .W eh o p et h a ta t
some point our framework can be integrated into a dynamic model that incorporates capital
ﬂo w sa sw e l la sﬂows of goods and services. Second, in focusing on trade in manufactures
we do not model trade in nonmanufactures. Since nonmanufactures include such diverse
i t e m sa ss o yb e a n s ,c r u d eo i l ,h i ph o p ,a n dp a t e n tr o y a l t i e s( f o rt h el a s tt w o ,b i l a t e r a lt r a d e
data are limited anyway) we defer modeling their determinants for future work. For now
we simply treat each country’s nonmanufacturing trade deﬁc i ta sap a r a m e t e rt h a tw et a k e
from the data.
In this ﬁrst respect our work resembles Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2005), who also employ a
static trade model to examine the implications of eliminating current account imbalances.
Focusing on real exchange rates and the terms of trade, they ignore real wages and welfare,
approach, in a model with capital accumulation, for assessing the contribution of trade to development.
7Padamitriou et al. (2006) provide an excellent review of the debate about the causes and consequences
of the U.S. deﬁcit.
4which are central to our analysis. Furthermore their quantitative analysis employs a stylized
three-region model with much symmetry imposed. In contrast, our framework can grapple
with an arbitrary number of countries while capturing the asymmetries apparent in the
GDP and trade data. We thus capture much more tightly geographic features of the world.
Where comparable, our results are closest to what Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ call a “very gradual”
unwinding, or a decade-long adjustment.
While our framework can quite handily deal with a multitude of countries, its analytic
essence derives from the two-country model of trade and unilateral transfers of Dornbusch,
Fischer, and Samuelson (1977). We explore the connection between our analysis and this
earlier literature in the Appendix, showing how a marriage of our techniques and theirs
can deliver a sensible back-of-the envelope calculation about the implication removing a
transfer from the rest of the world to the United States.
1 World Equilibrium
Consider a world of N countries (with n denoting an importer and i an exporter), a con-
tinuum of diﬀerentiated goods, and a constant elasticity of substitution aggregator (with
parameter σ). Under these conditions, several theories of international trade lead to a





where πni is country i’s share in country n’s spending. Eaton and Kortum (2002) derive
such an expression (their equation (10)) from a Ricardian model in which Ti reﬂects the
absolute advantage of country i, ci the cost of inputs there, and dni ≥ 1 the additional
“iceberg” cost of delivering goods to n from i.T h e p a r a m e t e r θ, which in the Ricardian
5model reﬂects comparative advantage, governs the sensitivity of demand to cost.8
We apply this equation to bilateral trade in manufactures among our forty countries.
Multiplying it by total spending on manufacturing in each country n, denoted by XM
n ,a n d










i is country i’s gross production of manufactures.
If trade balances, as is often assumed, then XM
i = Y M
i . Since our focus here is on the
yawning deﬁcits and surpluses in manufactures, we don’t impose this condition. Instead we
simply acknowledge the deﬁcits that we observe, DM
i = XM
i −Y M
i in our general-equilibrium
formulation.
To recognize (i) that manufactures are only one component of ﬁnal expenditure and
(ii) that much of the gross output of manufactures goes into making manufactures we need
two additional parameters. We denote the share of ﬁnal spending on manufactures as α
and the share of value added in manufacturing gross production as β. We are following
Alvarez and Lucas (2006) in treating ﬁnal demand as an aggregate of manufactures and
nonmanufactures, with manufactures having a share α.













8As Eaton and Kortum (2002) point out, equivalent formulations emerge under Armington assumptions,
as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), or monopolistic competition, as in Redding and Venables (2004).
In the ﬁrst case Ti is the share of country i’s goods in preferences while in the second it is the number
of goods that country i produces. In either case, the parameter θ is replaced by σ − 1. Yet another
formulation follows from specifying a Pareto distribution, with parameter θ, in the model of Melitz (2003),
as in Chaney (2006).
6where wi reﬂects wages in country i.
E a t o na n dK o r t u m( 2 0 0 2 )s h o w( t h e i re q u a t i o n( 1 6 ) )t h a tw i t haC E Sa g g r e g a t o rf o r
manufactures the price index in country n is given by:












where γ is a constant that depends on only the parameters θ and σ.T h u sw ec a nr e w r i t e
the trade share (3) as:










We denote the total labor supply in country i as Li, which we treat as exogenous. Under
perfect competition ﬁnal output, or GDP, is Yi = wiLi while ﬁnal spending is Xi = Yi+Di,
where Di is the overall trade deﬁcit.9 To connect ﬁnal spending with production and
spending on manufactures, we write total demand for manufactures by country i as the
sum of ﬁnal and intermediate demand:
X
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9Our analysis is consistent with an arbitrary number of factors as long as there are no systematic factor-
intensity diﬀerences between manufactures and nonmanufactures. In this case Li represents a (column)
vector of factor endowments and wi (when it multiplies Li) a (row) vector of factor rewards or (when it
appears without Li) as an index of factor rewards. In keeping with the Ricardian origins of our model we
nevertheless refer to the factor input as “labor” and its reward as the “wage.”
7Substituting these expressions into the goods market clearing conditions (2) we get:


















Taking as given (i) the trade imbalances Di and DM
i , (ii) labor supplies Li, (iii) para-
meters of technology Ti, (iv) parameters of trade costs dni, and (v) parameters α, β,a n d
θ, an equilibrium is a set of wages wi and prices pi that satisfy (4) and (6), with πni given
by (5).
We can resolve for the equilibrium under counterfactual trade imbalances, denoted D0
i
and DM0
i . We denote the post adjustment value of any variable x as x0 and the change in
























































After some manipulation, these two sets of equations can be rewritten as:









































We use equations (7) and (8) to solve for the changes in wages b w and prices b p that maintain
equilibrium under counterfactual assumptions about imbalances, using data on the original
8values of GDP for the Y ’s and trade shares for the π’s. What’s neat about this represen-
tation is that, aside from GDP and bilateral trade data, we only need values for the three
parameters α, β,a n dθ.
It is straightforward, using Theorems 1, 2, and 3 of Alvarez and Lucas (2006), to prove




b wiYi = Y,
i.e. world GDP Y is treated as the numeraire.
The particular exercise we conduct here is to ask what would happen if the manufac-
turing trade deﬁcits had to adjust to set all current accounts to zero. That is, for each






where CAn is country n’s original current account surplus and DM
n its original manufactur-
ing trade deﬁc i ti n2 0 0 4( c o l u m n4o fT a b l e2p r e s e n t s−DM0
n ).10 In our counterfactual, we
are ﬁxing the values of the current account net of the manufacturing trade balance as well
as the trade balance on goods and service net of the manufacturing trade balance. What
t h a tm e a n si st h a tt h e s em a g n i t u d e sa r eﬁxed as a fraction of world GDP.
10In doing so, we set each country’s total counterfactual trade deﬁcit to:
D0
n = DM0
n + Dn − DM
n .
92 Calibration and Computation
A s i d ef r o md a t ao n2 0 0 4G D P ’ s( f o rt h eY ’s) and on 2004 trade shares (for the π’s) to
stick in (7) and (8), we need values for the parameters θ, α,a n dβ.
We set θ =8 .28 as estimated in Eaton and Kortum (2002) using price data. We also
consider the lower value of θ =3 .60 obtained in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum
(2003).













n is manufacturing value added (available for most of our countries from World
Development Indicators). We calculate the ratio of manufacturing value added plus the
trade deﬁcit in manufactures to GDP plus the overall trade deﬁcit on goods and services.
Averaging this ratio across countries in our sample (for which data on manufacturing value
added was available) yields α =0 .188.
Notice that βn = V M
n /Y M
n . From United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(2006) we have data for many of our countries on both manufacturing value added and
manufacturing gross production. Averaging this ratio yields β =0 .312.
A simple iterative procedure provides the solution b w and b p. With 40 countries, run-
ning this procedure in GAUSS on a good quality laptop, the solution is obtained almost
instantaneously.
For each country i =1 ,...,40, we present the change in a set of outcomes, presented as
the ratio of the counterfactual value to its original value. The wage change for country i is
simply b wi itself, which also equals that country’s change in GDP. County i’s counterfactual
GDP is hence Y 0
i = b wiYi. Since we also solve for b pi, we can express the change in the
10real wage as (b wi/b pi)α. Taking into account the static gain or loss from setting the current



























































Table 3 reports the changes to relative wages, real wages, and welfare that our exercise
claims are required to achieve the target manufacturing trade deﬁcits reported in Table 2.
Note that these numbers imply less than a 5 percent increase in the wage for either China,
Germany, or Japan, the big surplus countries, and a 7 percent decline for the United States.
In other words, despite the large U.S. trade deﬁcit, the results imply that achieving balance
is associated with a fairly modest 10 percent decline in the value of the U.S. dollar relative
to the currencies of the big surplus countries (assuming the adjustment takes the form of
an exchange rate realignment, holding wages ﬁxed as expressed in the local currency).
11The associated changes in the real wage, reported in column 2, are negligible for these
large countries. There are two reasons why the real wage eﬀects are so attenuated. For one
thing, the trade share data imply a huge “home bias” in manufacturing (that is, countries
spend a disproportionately large amount on domestically produced goods) so that domestic
manufactures, produced with local labor, dominate the manufacturing price index. For
another, with manufactures constituting less than twenty percent of ﬁnal expenditure, the
nontraded sector dominates the overall price index.
The third column reports the change in real expenditure taking into account the change
in the deﬁcit. Here the eﬀects are more pronounced, and largely dominated by the change
in the current account itself. Together the second and third columns indicate a small
“secondary burden” of adjusting current account deﬁcits. Countries that must reduce their
deﬁcits experience a lower real wage, so real expenditure falls by more than the drop in
transfers from abroad, with the opposite for countries that expand their deﬁcits. But the
gain or loss of the transfer itself overwhelms the real wage adjustment in its eﬀect on
welfare.
We’ve solved for wages in the new equilibrium of a 40 country trading system. How
well could we have predicted each country’s wage change just from its own existing current
account? Figure 1 plots the wage change in Table 3 against the current account deﬁcit in
Table 3 relative to GDP. The relationship is generally downward sloping but not monotonic.
While Algeria and Norway have smaller surpluses than Switzerland relative to their GDP,
they require a much larger wage increase due to their relative isolation. At the other
extreme Portugal runs a larger deﬁcit than Australia but needs less of a wage decline to
adjust. The direction of the wage change is in accordance with the direction of the required
b a l a n c ee x c e p tf o rF r a n c e ,w h e r et h ew a g eg o e su ps l i g h t l yd e s p i t ei t sc u r r e n td e ﬁcit.
12At r a d ed e ﬁcit in manufactures crowds out domestic manufacturing. Since our coun-
terfactual experiment involves adjustments in manufacturing trade deﬁcits, it has con-
sequences for manufacturing’s share of production. The last column of Table 3 reports
the change in the manufacturing share of GDP resulting from the closing of the current
account deﬁcit. The results indicate the largest increase in the United States, of 4.7 per-
centage points. The direction of the change is always predicted by the sign of the current
account surplus, with deﬁcit countries needing to produce more and surplus countries less.
But the magnitudes are quite diﬀerent as a consequence of the changes in relative market
sizes implied by relative wage changes.
How does the overall adjustment get reﬂe c t e di nb i l a t e r a ld e ﬁcits for manufactures?
Table 4 reports the actual and counterfactual bilateral deﬁcits for both the United States
and China with each other country. Note that the U.S. deﬁcit with Japan and South
Korea virtually disappear while the U.S. deﬁcit with Germany swings toward a signiﬁcant
surplus. A large deﬁcit with China nevertheless remains. At the same time China continues
to run large deﬁcits with Korea and Japan. These varied responses reﬂect asymmetries in
the bilateral resistance measures indicated by current trade patterns. Projecting these
asymmetries into post-adjustment world still means that there is enormous room for large
bilateral imbalances even in a world with overall balance.
How much do our results depend on our choice of the parameter θ? Using the smaller
value of θ =3 .60 from BEJK (2003) implies that more wage adjustment is necessary (since,
in that case, trade shares are less responsive to wages). With this lower value, the U.S.
wage falls by 18 percent relative to the China’s and by about 20 percent relative to Japan’s
and Germany’s. Nevertheless the decline in the U.S. real wage barely exceeds 1 percent.
13The implications for bilateral trade ﬂows are nearly invariant to the choice of θ.11
4C o n c l u s i o n
We have asked what a static trade model has to say about the magnitudes of adjustments
needed to close current account imbalances as they stood in 2004. By assumption the
manufacturing sector bears the full burden of adjustment, which means that we are likely
providing an upper bound on the required changes there. Given our baseline parameters,
U.S. GDP must fall about seven percent relative to world GDP, while GDP in the major
surplus countries rises by two to four percent. With a smaller elasticity (meaning trade
shares are less responsive to costs), these adjustments are roughly doubled. In either case,
the decline in real wages in the United States is muted, around one percent, since most
goods can’t be traded and even those that could be are often purchased from domestic
producers in a large economy like the United States. According to our static analysis, the
main welfare cost of eliminating the current account deﬁc i ti ss i m p l yt h el o s so ft h ef r e e
lunch, i.e. the loss of goods that we currently consume but do not pay for until later. That
cost is on the order of six percent of GDP.
11Our analysis does not acknowledge any delay in the response to the counterfactual experiment that
we conduct. We have not introduced any frictions in getting from here to there. Ruhl (2005) provides
an explicit dynamic model to reconcile the observed short-run and long-run responsiveness of trade ﬂows
to changes in policy. Our lower value of θ may better reﬂect a short-run response and the higher one a
long-run response.
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AA T w o - C o u n t r y E x a m p l e
With just two countries our analysis collapses to a version of the two-country model of
trade and unilateral transfers of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (DFS, 1977). We
show how that framework can be used to deliver a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the
16wage adjustment required to achieve a zero current account between the United States and
the rest of the world.
Now the world consists of just two countries: the United States and ROW (denoted
w i t ha* ) . A sa b o v et h e r ea r eac o n t i n u u mo fg o o d sz ∈ [0,1]. Labor endowments are L
and L∗. Following DFS we assume Cobb-Douglas preferences. Following their notation the
productivity of labor in the United States relative to ROW is A(z) w h e r et h eg o o d sa r e
ordered so that A(z) is decreasing in z. Markets are perfectly competitive. We treat the
wage in ROW w∗ as the numeraire.
If the relative wage of the United States is ω = w/w∗ then the United States will
produce goods z ∈ [0,z] and ROW will produce the rest, where the threshold good satisﬁes
(9) A(z)=ω.
To close the model we typically impose trade balance so that the value of US imports







An equilibrium is a pair (ω,z) satisfying (9) and (10).
In fact, the same equilibrium arises if the United State runs a trade deﬁcit, D = I −E.
Then spending by the United States is X = wL + D and spending by ROW is X∗ =
w∗L∗ − D. Goods market clearing requires
(1 − z)(wL+ D)=z(w
∗L
∗ − D)+D
which reduces to (10). The allocation of world production is determined by comparative
advantage and has nothing to do with which country is spending more or less. This case
captures the argument put forward by Ohlin.
17This neutrality arises because we have not introduced any home-bias in expenditures
so what is transferred would have been spent the same way by transferrer and transferee.
Suppose instead that consumers in both countries allocate a fraction α of their spending
to tradable goods, with the rest spent on nontradables. Nontradables are produced with
local labor under constant returns.
The goods market clearing condition becomes













An equilibrium pair (ω,z) now must satisfy (9) and (11). Relative to D =0 , a positive
deﬁc i ts h i f t su p( 1 1 )f o ra n yg i v e nz, thus leading to an equilibrium with a higher US
relative wage ω and lower z. The intuition is that a positive deﬁcit increases US spending
and hence spending on nontradables. To meet this extra demand US workers shift out of
the tradables sector and into the nontradables sector. As they do so, remaining workers
in the tradable sector specialize in producing a narrower range of products, for which US
relative productivity is higher. Thus, the relative wage of US workers goes up.











Relative to the case of D =0 , this share is lower if D>0.T h e d e ﬁcit crowds out the
tradable sector.
What is less apparent in the model, yet perhaps more important, is what happens to
the US real wage. A small share of tradables α, which is a necessary condition for the
18deﬁc i tt oh a v el a r g ee ﬀects on the relative wage, also implies a large share of spending on
goods whose price exactly parallels changes in the wage. Thus, real wage changes will arise
only through tradables. And, in a big country like the United States, even many tradable
goods are purchased locally. We now parameterize a version of the DFS model that renders
it the two-country version of the model considered in the main text.
The parameterized probabilistic formulation of the Ricardian model developed in Eaton














Consider the equilibrium (ω,z) resulting from the current deﬁcit of D, generating ob-
served GDP’s of Y = wL and Y ∗ = w∗L∗. Under some counterfactual deﬁcit D0 the



















Consider the counterfactual D0 =0so that the change in the relative wage satisﬁes
(1 − z













Using data for the United States in 2006 (in US$ trillions) we have Y =1 3 .2,Y∗ =3 3 .9,




E/(Y ∗ − D)
I/(Y + D)
=0 .27
(hence z =0 .21 and α =0 .2). Using the estimate of θ =8 .28 from Eaton and Kortum
(2002) we ﬁnd b ω =0 .96, approximately a 4% decline in the US relative wage. Using the
value of θ =3 .60 from BEJK (2003) yields b ω =0 .92. In either case this change in relative
wages is largely cushioned by a change in prices so that the real wage in the United States
does not fall much.
To see the eﬀect on prices we need to take a stand on labor requirements in each country.









In the United States, the resulting prices of tradables are p(z)=wa(z) for z ≤ z and
p(z)=w∗a∗(z) for z ≥ z. Integrating over these prices, the exact price index for tradables








12These numbers are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis except for GDP in ROW which was taken
from World Bank (2006), assuming that world GDP grew at the same rate as US GDP from 2005 to 2006.




−θ +( 1− z)
i−1/θ
.
Taking into account non-tradables, the change in the real wage is (b ω/b p)α.T h e U . S . r e a l
wage declines by a bit less than 1 percent for θ =8 .28 a n dab i tm o r et h a n1p e r c e n tf o r




  (US$ bill.) (% GDP) balance balance w/ US w/ China
Alg Algeria 85.0 12.4 14.6 3.1 -13.2 -0.6 -0.9
Arg Argentina 153.0 4.7 3.1 7.2 -10.3 -1.8 -0.9
Aul Australia 637.3 -38.8 -6.1 -23.2 -60.3 -10.4 -10.1
Aut Austria 292.3 2.0 0.7 1.3 -1.1 1.8 -0.8
BeN BelLuxNeth 963.2 73.0 7.6 60.7 -63.7 -17.4 -19.4
Bra Brazil 604.0 13.0 2.2 24.5 5.8 5.7 -1.8
Can Canada 978.0 22.4 2.3 35.9 -26.9 29.2 -13.9
Chl Chile 95.0 2.8 3.0 4.0 -1.9 -1.2 0.3
ChH ChinaHK 2097.6 85.6 4.1 59.5 121.8 166.6 0.0
Col Colombia 96.8 0.3 0.3 -4.8 -8.4 -2.4 -1.1
Den Denmark 241.4 7.2 3.0 7.9 -9.5 1.2 -1.8
Egy Egypt, Arab Rep. 78.8 5.2 6.6 -4.9 -1.2 0.4 -0.5
Fin Finland 185.9 11.0 5.9 6.0 14.4 1.6 0.5
Fra France 2046.7 -5.6 -0.3 -2.1 -5.3 1.2 -11.3
Ger Germany 2740.6 103.0 3.8 131.4 209.5 27.2 -7.0
Gre Greece 205.2 -12.2 -6.0 -17.1 -29.5 -1.7 -1.7
Ind India 694.7 8.1 1.2 -15.7 5.4 9.1 -0.8
IMT IndonMalySingThai 641.8 54.6 8.5 55.0 19.6 24.0 18.8
Ire Ireland 181.6 0.2 0.1 21.8 66.2 18.1 -2.0
Isr Israel 116.9 4.4 3.8 -4.1 -0.7 8.8 -0.5
Ita Italy 1677.8 -14.5 -0.9 7.7 21.2 15.0 -5.0
Jap Japan 4622.8 173.3 3.7 89.7 277.0 84.4 40.8
Kor Korea, Rep. 679.7 29.4 4.3 25.0 82.1 22.8 43.4
Mex Mexico 683.5 -5.4 -0.8 -19.0 -22.0 27.9 -12.3
NZ New Zealand 98.9 -5.2 -5.3 -5.1 -11.0 -1.3 -1.8
Nor Norway 250.1 36.0 14.4 31.6 -16.4 -0.2 -1.8
Pak Pakistan 96.1 0.4 0.5 -10.5 -0.4 1.8 -0.3
Per Peru 68.7 1.2 1.8 -2.6 -2.7 0.4 -0.7
Phi Philippines 90.1 2.9 3.2 -12.0 13.5 0.7 8.9
Por Portugal 167.7 -11.7 -7.0 -18.0 -10.7 0.9 -0.3
Rus Russian Federation 590.4 59.8 10.1 67.9 7.7 4.7 0.8
SA South Africa 214.7 -6.2 -2.9 -6.1 -2.9 1.7 -1.8
Spa Spain 1039.9 -53.6 -5.2 -44.3 -62.8 -1.1 -8.7
Swe Sweden 346.4 28.7 8.3 24.6 23.2 8.0 0.5
Swi Switzerland 357.5 57.8 16.2 30.0 9.5 5.3 3.8
Tur Turkey 302.8 -14.3 -4.7 -15.6 -18.7 1.5 -3.8
UK United Kingdom 2124.4 -33.9 -1.6 -68.5 -109.2 3.8 -21.0
USA United States 11711.8 -664.0 -5.7 -615.8 -484.6 0.0 -166.6
Ven Venezuela, RB 110.1 15.1 13.7 13.3 -6.2 -1.8 -0.3
ROW Rest of World 2996.7 50.7 1.7 181.2 102.6 50.9 59.5
* All data are for 2004 in US$ billions (unless labeled otherwise)
Current Account
balance




Algeria 0.5 13.7 -13.2 -25.5
Argentina 10.4 20.6 -10.3 -14.9
Australia 25.0 85.2 -60.3 -21.4
Austria 82.4 83.5 -1.1 -3.1
BelLuxNeth 307.8 371.6 -63.7 -136.8
Brazil 53.2 47.4 5.8 -7.2
Canada 198.2 225.0 -26.9 -49.3
Chile 13.5 15.4 -1.9 -4.7
ChinaHK 816.8 695.0 121.8 36.2
Colombia 6.0 14.4 -8.4 -8.7
Denmark 42.6 52.2 -9.5 -16.7
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5.5 6.7 -1.2 -6.4
Finland 50.5 36.2 14.4 3.4
France 333.0 338.2 -5.3 -0.3
Germany 750.9 541.4 209.5 106.5
Greece 9.3 38.9 -29.5 -17.3
India 58.5 53.1 5.4 -2.7
IndonMalySingThai 279.1 259.5 19.6 -35.1
Ireland 115.2 49.1 66.2 66.0
Israel 32.3 32.9 -0.7 -5.1
Italy 278.3 257.1 21.2 35.6
Japan 545.2 268.2 277.0 103.7
Korea, Rep. 228.4 146.3 82.1 52.6
Mexico 148.1 170.1 -22.0 -16.6
New Zealand 6.6 17.6 -11.0 -5.8
Norway 22.8 39.2 -16.4 -52.4
Pakistan 10.0 10.5 -0.4 -0.9
Peru 4.0 6.7 -2.7 -3.9
Philippines 48.8 35.3 13.5 10.6
Portugal 29.9 40.6 -10.7 -1.0
Russian Federation 59.1 51.4 7.7 -52.2
South Africa 30.0 32.9 -2.9 3.3
Spain 132.0 194.7 -62.8 -9.1
Sweden 100.3 77.1 23.2 -5.5
Switzerland 106.6 97.1 9.5 -48.4
Turkey 51.0 69.6 -18.7 -4.3
United Kingdom 254.5 363.7 -109.2 -75.3
United States 673.7 1158.3 -484.6 179.4
Venezuela, RB 5.7 11.9 -6.2 -21.3
ROW 746.5 643.9 102.6 51.9
* All data are for 2004 in US$ billions.
Counterfactual    
balance
 
Table 2: Trade in Manufactures
Gross trade Change
Relative Real in mfg.
wage wage Welfare share
Algeria 1.558 1.078 1.198 -1.8
Argentina 1.054 1.006 1.039 -2.0
Australia 0.904 0.990 0.929 4.5
Austria 1.012 0.999 1.006 -0.5
BelLuxNeth 1.152 1.025 1.106 -4.3
Brazil 1.024 1.002 1.024 -1.7
Canada 1.006 1.005 1.029 -1.8
Chile 1.035 1.004 1.036 -2.3
ChinaHK 1.025 1.001 1.043 -3.4
Colombia 1.011 1.002 1.004 -0.2
Denmark 1.046 1.003 1.034 -2.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.102 1.007 1.058 -4.8
Finland 1.052 1.003 1.063 -4.9
France 1.004 0.999 0.997 0.2
Germany 1.031 1.002 1.042 -3.2
Greece 0.888 0.981 0.930 3.8
India 1.017 1.000 1.011 -1.0
IndonMalySingThai 1.084 1.012 1.107 -6.5
Ireland 1.000 1.000 1.001 -0.1
Israel 1.024 1.002 1.037 -3.0
Italy 1.000 0.999 0.990 0.7
Japan 1.037 1.001 1.039 -3.1
Korea, Rep. 1.024 1.002 1.046 -3.7
Mexico 0.971 0.999 0.992 0.6
New Zealand 0.911 0.989 0.940 3.7
Norway 1.345 1.042 1.208 -6.4
Pakistan 1.005 1.000 1.003 -0.4
Peru 1.023 1.002 1.018 -1.4
Philippines 1.015 1.001 1.028 -2.8
Portugal 0.939 0.991 0.931 5.8
Russian Federation 1.152 1.011 1.129 -7.0
South Africa 0.977 0.997 0.969 2.4
Spain 0.952 0.993 0.943 4.1
Sweden 1.073 1.006 1.095 -6.6
Switzerland 1.198 1.025 1.192 -11.1
Turkey 0.957 0.992 0.948 3.8
United Kingdom 0.986 0.997 0.982 1.3
United States 0.932 0.995 0.941 4.7
Venezuela, RB 1.311 1.038 1.195 -6.6
ROW 1.018 1.000 1.019 -1.4
* The first three columns report the changes as x'/x,
   where x' is the counterfactual value. The last column
   reports the change in terms of percentage points.
Table 3: Consequences of Counterfactual Current Account Balance
Ratio change inBalance with the US Balance with China
Actual C\factual Actual C\factual
Algeria -0.6 -2.0 -0.9 -1.5
Argentina -1.8 -4.8 -0.9 -1.0
Australia -10.4 -11.3 -10.1 -2.7
Austria 1.8 -2.3 -0.8 -0.8
BelLuxNeth -17.4 -44.8 -19.4 -18.0
Brazil 5.7 -7.1 -1.8 -1.7
Canada 29.2 -23.7 -13.9 -7.1
Chile -1.2 -3.5 0.3 0.3
ChinaHK 166.6 64.9   
Colombia -2.4 -5.0 -1.1 -0.9
Denmark 1.2 -1.9 -1.8 -2.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.4 -0.9 -0.5 -0.8
Finland 1.6 -1.6 0.5 -0.3
France 1.2 -22.5 -11.3 -9.3
Germany 27.2 -30.8 -7.0 -8.6
Greece -1.7 -2.5 -1.7 -1.3
India 9.1 0.4 -0.8 -0.9
IndonMalySingThai 24.0 -24.0 18.8 13.6
Ireland 18.1 7.9 -2.0 -1.2
Israel 8.8 1.3 -0.5 -0.3
Italy 15.0 1.9 -5.0 -3.6
Japan 84.4 -3.5 40.8 18.3
Korea, Rep. 22.8 -6.5 43.4 40.5
Mexico 27.9 2.9 -12.3 -7.2
New Zealand -1.3 -1.6 -1.8 -0.8
Norway -0.2 -5.3 -1.8 -3.7
Pakistan 1.8 0.3 -0.3 -0.2
Peru 0.4 -1.1 -0.7 -0.6
Philippines 0.7 -5.9 8.9 9.3
Portugal 0.9 0.4 -0.3 -0.1
Russian Federation 4.7 -4.0 0.8 -4.0
South Africa 1.7 -0.9 -1.8 -0.7
Spain -1.1 -5.3 -8.7 -6.7
Sweden 8.0 -0.1 0.5 -0.7
Switzerland 5.3 -5.6 3.8 0.6
Turkey 1.5 -1.1 -3.8 -3.4
United Kingdom 3.8 -22.5 -21.0 -17.0
United States     -166.6 -64.9
Venezuela, RB -1.8 -9.9 -0.3 -0.6
ROW 50.9 2.6 59.5 54.0
* All values are in US$ billions.
Table 4: Actual and Counterfactual Bilateral Imbalance Change Counterfactual  balance
Relative Real in mfg. with with
wage wage Welfare share US China
Algeria 1.624 1.082 1.198 -1.1 -2.0 -1.5
Argentina 1.099 1.010 1.044 -1.6 -4.7 -1.0
Australia 0.823 0.979 0.917 4.1 -10.5 -2.8
Austria 1.031 0.999 1.006 -0.5 -2.2 -0.8
BelLuxNeth 1.224 1.034 1.115 -3.6 -46.9 -19.7
Brazil 1.053 1.003 1.027 -1.7 -6.9 -1.8
Canada 1.006 1.009 1.033 -1.8 -23.2 -7.3
Chile 1.071 1.007 1.040 -2.1 -3.5 0.3
ChinaHK 1.055 1.003 1.044 -3.4 63.6  
Colombia 1.023 1.003 1.005 -0.1 -4.8 -1.0
Denmark 1.092 1.006 1.037 -1.8 -1.8 -2.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.205 1.012 1.054 -4.4 -0.8 -0.8
Finland 1.118 1.007 1.066 -5.0 -1.6 -0.3
France 1.013 0.999 0.996 0.2 -21.8 -9.6
Germany 1.072 1.005 1.045 -3.3 -30.6 -9.2
Greece 0.819 0.968 0.919 3.1 -2.3 -1.2
India 1.038 1.001 1.011 -1.0 0.5 -0.8
IndonMalySingThai 1.156 1.021 1.117 -6.2 -24.4 14.7
Ireland 1.009 1.001 1.003 -0.4 7.1 -1.3
Israel 1.049 1.004 1.038 -2.9 1.5 -0.3
Italy 1.004 0.997 0.989 0.7 1.9 -3.6
Japan 1.085 1.003 1.040 -3.2 -4.6 17.4
Korea, Rep. 1.057 1.004 1.048 -3.9 -6.7 41.0
Mexico 0.940 0.998 0.992 0.5 2.9 -7.2
New Zealand 0.843 0.980 0.930 3.2 -1.5 -0.9
Norway 1.499 1.053 1.219 -4.8 -5.1 -3.8
Pakistan 1.013 0.999 1.002 -0.4 0.3 -0.2
Peru 1.047 1.004 1.019 -1.3 -1.1 -0.6
Philippines 1.041 1.004 1.026 -3.2 -5.9 9.3
Portugal 0.885 0.983 0.925 5.8 0.3 -0.1
Russian Federation 1.301 1.019 1.140 -6.1 -3.7 -3.9
South Africa 0.958 0.994 0.967 2.4 -0.9 -0.8
Spain 0.910 0.986 0.936 4.1 -4.9 -6.6
Sweden 1.157 1.012 1.101 -6.6 0.0 -0.7
Switzerland 1.354 1.041 1.201 -10.0 -5.6 1.0
Turkey 0.922 0.985 0.941 3.7 -1.1 -3.3
United Kingdom 0.978 0.995 0.980 1.2 -21.4 -17.1
United States 0.865 0.989 0.935 4.8   -63.6
Venezuela, RB 1.476 1.051 1.209 -5.0 -9.7 -0.6
ROW 1.042 1.001 1.021 -1.4 2.4 54.6
* The results in this table are based on "theta" of 3.60 (whereas all other results use 8.28)..
  The first three columns report the changes as x'/x, where x' is the counterfactual value.
  The fourth column reports the change in terms of percentage points.
  The last two columns report the counterfactual values themselves (in US$ billions).
Ratio change in











          Figure 1: Current Account and Wage Change
2004 current account balance (share of GDP)
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